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Abstract 
We use a new high-frequency (monthly) longitudinal survey and a difference-in-
differences strategy to separately estimate the announcement and disbursement effects of an 
exogenous permanent income shock on subjective well-being. This permanent income shock 
is the introduction of Singapore’s first national non-contributory pension, the Silver Support 
Scheme. The pension improved the life satisfaction of recipients; this effect appears to be 
driven by social, household income, and economic satisfaction. Consistent with the predictions 
of the permanent income hypothesis, well-being improved at announcement, but did not 
improve significantly further at disbursement (i.e. the difference between announcement and 
disbursement effects is not statistically different from zero). In addition, we find evidence that 
the marginal utility of income varies – recipients who reported being less financially prepared 
for retirement exhibited larger increases in well-being. Surprisingly, we find little evidence of 
such heterogeneity by individuals’ net assets. Lastly, well-being did not improve if an 
individual’s spouse received SSS payouts but he/she did not. Our results suggest that future 
policies could consider heterogeneity among individuals for greater welfare gains.  
 
JEL classification: H3, I1, I3 
Keywords: subjective well-being, life satisfaction, health, income, non-contributory pension 
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1 Introduction  
Since Easterlin (1974)’s work on income and happiness, interest in the empirical link 
between income and subjective well-being has grown substantially amongst economists. In 
recent years, more convincing evidence on the causal impact of income on happiness (e.g. 
Frijters et al., 2004; Gardner & Oswald, 2007) has emerged. In addition, researchers are starting 
to go beyond average effects to look at heterogeneity in the effect of income on happiness 
arising from differences in individual characteristics (e.g. personality (Boyce & Wood, 2011) 
and health (Finkelstein et al., 2013)). Two recent papers also show that – consistent with the 
permanent income hypothesis – permanent income shocks lead to larger subjective well-being 
responses than transitory shocks (Bayer & Juessen, 2015; Cai & Park, 2016).   
We add to this literature by using a new, high-frequency (monthly) panel and a natural 
experiment in Singapore to separately estimate the announcement and disbursement effects of 
an exogenous permanent income increase on life satisfaction and its sub-domains. In addition, 
we examine how these effects may vary by self-assessed financial preparation for retirement 
versus net assets, and investigate whether an individual’s subjective well-being improves with 
increases in his or her spouse’s permanent income.  
The permanent income increase we study comes in the form of Singapore’s first national 
non-contributory pension scheme (the Silver Support Scheme, or SSS). The SSS targets the 
neediest 20 – 30% of Singaporean citizens aged 65 and above. Details of the SSS (e.g. exact 
qualifying criteria and payout quantum) were announced in end-March 2016, followed by the 
disbursement of its first cash payout in end-July 2016. Eligibility for payouts in the period we 
study is pre-determined, as it is based on the government’s administrative data from 2015. 
Eligibility is automatically assessed by the government, and payouts are made automatically to 
all who are eligible via well-established channels.  
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The design of the SSS allows us to identify its causal impact via a difference-in-
differences (DiD) strategy which includes individual1 and time fixed effects. Our sample 
consists of those who are age-eligible (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), and the treated group 
is defined as those who received SSS while controls are those who did not. To address concerns 
that baseline differences in the characteristics of the treatment and control groups could 
invalidate the underlying DiD assumption of parallel trends, we construct more similar 
treatment and control groups by trimming our sample based on their propensity to receive SSS. 
In addition, we carry out a battery of robustness checks (described more fully in Section 7), 
which include checks that address potential violations of the parallel trends assumption in 
different ways. These robustness checks include the addition of different group-specific time 
fixed effects and the use of different reweighting schemes to better match the treatment and 
control groups (e.g. using Abadie (2005)’s semi-parametric DiD on the full sample). Our 
results are robust to these checks. 
Our data comes from a new population-representative, high-frequency longitudinal 
survey of elderly Singaporeans – the Singapore Life Panel, or SLP2. The SLP is run by the 
Centre for Research on the Economics of Ageing (CREA) at the Singapore Management 
University, and was designed in collaboration with the creators of the US Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and a number of its sister surveys, such as the American Life Panel. 
15,000 Singapore citizens and permanent residents aged between 50 and 70, and their spouses, 
were initially recruited for a baseline survey in May – July 2015. Follow-up surveys were sent 
monthly, and attrition has been low. The monthly surveys allow us to track the changes in 
individuals’ subjective well-being from the period before the announcement in end-March 
                                                 
1 The use of individual fixed effects when studying subjective well-being is important, to ensure that individual 
unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. personality differences) does not drive our results (Ferrer‐i‐Carbonell & Frijters, 
2004). 
2 See Vaithianathan et al. (2017) and https://crea.smu.edu.sg/singapore-monthly-panel for additional information 
on the SLP.  
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2016, through the post-announcement / pre-disbursement period, to the post-disbursement 
period after July 2016.   
We find that recipients of SSS payouts, who receive an average of around S$500 per 
quarter in our sample, experienced a statistically significant improvement of 2.5% of the 
baseline mean (or 0.11 SD) in overall life satisfaction upon SSS announcement; there seems to 
be no additional improvement after the disbursement of SSS payouts (i.e. the disbursement 
effect is not statistically different from the announcement effect). These results seem to be 
driven in part by improvements in recipients’ satisfaction with their social contacts and family 
life, household income and economic situation3. In addition, we find evidence that the marginal 
utility of income varies across different dimensions. First, SSS recipients who felt less 
financially prepared for retirement at the baseline survey wave experienced a higher increase 
in satisfaction. Surprisingly, we find little evidence of such heterogeneity when we examine 
heterogeneity in responses by differences in baseline asset levels. Second, the lack of 
statistically significant overall effects in health satisfaction and condition masks considerable 
heterogeneity. Those who report being less financially prepared for retirement experienced a 
statistically significant larger improvement in self-rated health condition. Third, an individual’s 
satisfaction did not improve if only his/her spouse received SSS payouts while he/she did not.  
Our findings contribute mainly to the literature on income and subjective well-being. 
While the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) implies that forward-looking individuals’ utility 
should react only to unanticipated, but not anticipated income shocks (see e.g. Cai & Park, 
2016), empirical evidence on how subjective well-being reacts to unanticipated versus 
anticipated income shocks is scarce. We separately estimate the announcement and 
                                                 
3 The result for recipients’ satisfaction with the social contacts and family life is only marginally significant, while 
those for household income and economic situation are statistically significant. 
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disbursement effects of income increases on subjective well-being4, using a unique monthly 
longitudinal survey5. Our results are consistent with the predictions of the PIH: the release of 
detailed information about SSS eligibility led to immediate increases in subjective well-being 
even before payouts started, but there was no additional increase in subjective well-being upon 
disbursement of SSS payouts (i.e. the disbursement effect is not statistically different from the 
announcement effect). We also add to the evidence on how marginal utility of income may 
vary by individual characteristics, when we examine heterogeneous effects along the 
dimensions of perceived financial preparedness for retirement, net assets, and spousal receipt 
of income.  Our finding that the marginal utility of income varies by perceived financial 
preparedness for retirement (i.e. subjective wealth) but not actual net assets suggests that 
perceived financial preparedness for retirement could be more important that net assets in 
understanding how the marginal utility of income varies, at least among the age and 
socioeconomic group we study.  
Beyond the income and subjective well-being literature, our results add to the literature 
studying the effect of non-contributory pensions on subjective well-being (e.g. Bando et al., 
2016; Galiani et al., 2016). When coupled with results from a companion paper (Chen & Tan, 
2017), our findings suggest that the SSS improved recipients’ welfare without substantial 
crowding out of private transfers or changes in labour market behavior of current and future 
SSS beneficiaries6. The heterogeneous responses we document suggests that researchers 
should move beyond studying the average effects of non-contributory pensions, to provide a 
                                                 
4 Even in other fields, few non-finance papers have succeeded in capturing announcement effects. Blundell et al. 
(2011) and Agarwal and Qian (2014) are two examples that manage to do so; both papers show that ignoring 
announcement effects could bias policy effects downwards.  
5 The high-frequency data also addresses a common source of estimation bias arising from individuals’ adaptation 
to changes in their circumstances over time (see e.g. Clark et al. (2008) for evidence that people adapt to changes 
in conditions in the context of life satisfaction). Such high frequency data on subjective well-being, however, is 
uncommon. One example of a paper that tracks subjective well-being almost as frequently is by Frijters et al. 
(2011), who use quarterly data from Australia to study significant life events. 
6 We study the effects of SSS receipt on expenditure in the companion paper as well, but our results for expenditure 
are too imprecise for us to draw any definitive conclusions.  
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fuller picture of the effects of said pensions. Policymakers wishing to maximize welfare gains 
may also want to take such heterogeneity into consideration when designing new or refining 
existing non-contributory pensions. In addition, we add to the external validity of the existing 
non-contributory pension literature by presenting evidence from a country with different 
institutions and at a different stage of development, compared to those studied earlier. Lastly, 
our observation that recipients with a lower perceived level of financial preparedness 
experienced a larger improvement in self-rated health condition strengthens existing evidence 
on the causal impact of income on health (e.g. Frijters et al., 2005; Lindahl, 2005). 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the literature 
on income and subjective well-being. Section 3 provides background information on the Silver 
Support Scheme (SSS). Section 4 describes our data, and in Section 5 we elaborate on our 
identification strategy and empirical model. In Section 6, we present our results, while Section 
7 covers our robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Literature review on the impact of income on subjective well-being 
An attractive feature of self-reported levels of happiness or subjective well-being is that 
they can serve as alternative measures of utility and complement traditional revealed preference 
approaches. The suitability of self-reported happiness or well-being for this purpose is 
supported by a substantial amount of evidence. For example, there is a strong positive nexus 
between self-reported well-being and actual well-being (see e.g. Frey & Stutzer, 2002; 
Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). More recently, Fleurbaey and Schwandt (2015) present survey 
results suggesting that 90% of their sample do attempt to maximise their subjective well-being.  
Much research on subjective well-being within the economic literature focuses on the 
relationship between income and happiness. Early research using country-level data found that 
there was little, if any, increase in happiness even when real gross domestic product per capita 
had risen substantially over the years (e.g. Easterlin, 1974; Easterlin, 1995; Oswald, 1997). In 
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contrast, the positive relationship between income and happiness at a particular snapshot in 
time within a country is well established, i.e. richer people tend to report higher subjective 
well-being on average (e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2000), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004)). These 
seemingly conflicting conclusions can be reconciled if happiness were affected not only by 
absolute income, but also relative income. For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that 
an individual’s happiness is equally dependent on one’s own income and the income of one’s 
reference group. In addition, people are happier the larger their income gap as compared to 
their reference group.  
The main criticism levelled at research in this area is its lack of causal identification. For 
example, unobserved individual heterogeneity such as personality differences could affect both 
income and happiness. Increases in income can likewise be accompanied by a rise in working 
hours or occupational risk which may not be accounted for but can also affect subjective well-
being.    
To address this critical weakness, later papers utilise exogenous shocks such as historic 
institutional upheavals to establish a causal link between income and happiness. Frijters et al. 
(2004) find that increased household incomes in East Germany, after the German reunification 
in 1990, contributed to around 12% of the East Germans’ improvement in life satisfaction over 
time. Similarly, by exploiting the income changes during Russia’s post-transition years, Frijters 
et al. (2006) report that changes in real household incomes explain 10-30% of changes in life 
satisfaction.  
Making use of a much more common wealth shock, Gardner and Oswald (2007) and 
Apouey and Clark (2015) find that lottery winners have a higher level of mental wellbeing (but 
not self-assessed overall health).   
Other authors draw on income variations resulting from changes in public policies. 
Kronenberg et al. (2017) report that those who benefited from the 1999 introduction of the 
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United Kingdom National Minimum Wage experienced only limited short-run effects on 
mental health, while Reeves et al. (2016) find that the same policy reduced the probability of 
mental ill health for those who benefited. Lachowska (2016) shows that the 2008 economic 
stimulus tax rebates in the United States reduced feelings of stress and worry, with weaker 
evidence for an improvement in life and health satisfaction. Boyd-Swan et al. (2016) find 
positive effects of the 1990 earned income tax credit expansion in the United States, among 
potentially eligible women, on a range of subjective well-being measures covering mental well-
being, overall happiness, and self-esteem.  
Apart from natural experiments, Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) and Kilburn et al. (2016) 
also present positive evidence on happiness, life satisfaction, stress, and future outlook from 
experimental unconditional cash transfers in Kenya and Malawi respectively. 
The introduction of non-contributory pensions is another source of income shocks that 
generally improved well-being. Case (2004) find that beneficiaries of South Africa’s state old 
age pension experienced a lower level of depression and better self-reported health. Similarly, 
Galiani et al. (2016) and Bando et al. (2016) show that beneficiaries of a new pension 
experienced improved mental health and self-worth in Mexico and Peru respectively, but not 
life satisfaction. Cheng et al. (2016) find that the New Rural Pension Scheme in China led to 
reduced depression and better self-perceived relative economic situation, while Tseng and 
Petrie (2014) show that Taiwan’s permanent cash injection to elderly farmers improved mental 
health but not self-assessed health or life satisfaction. 
In addition to the focus on causal identification, recent research has moved beyond 
average effects of income on happiness. For example, Boyce and Wood (2011) investigate the 
heterogeneity of effects based on personality, while Finkelstein et al. (2013) look at how effects 
could vary by health status. Two recent papers show that the type of income shocks matters. 
Consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, permanent income shocks lead to larger 
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subjective well-being responses than transitory shocks (Bayer & Juessen, 2015; Cai & Park, 
2016).   
Our paper contributes to the literature by separately estimating the announcement and 
disbursement effects of an exogenous permanent income increase on life satisfaction and its 
sub-domains. We also examine how these effects may vary by self-assessed financial 
preparation for retirement versus net assets, and investigate whether an individual’s subjective 
well-being improves with his or her spouse’s receipt of income.  
3 Background on the Silver Support Scheme 
The Silver Support Scheme (SSS) is Singapore’s first national means-tested, non-
contributory pension, which permanently supplements the income of the neediest 20 – 30% of 
Singaporean citizens aged 65 and above. The SSS is an important addition to Singapore’s social 
security system, which has until now been mostly addressed by a defined contribution system 
known as the Central Provident Fund (CPF). Singaporeans (and their employers) contribute a 
proportion of income into their CPF accounts. These contributions are split across three 
accounts – funds from one account can be used for home purchase, funds from another can be 
used for healthcare expenses, while the last account sets aside money for retirement. 
Details of the SSS (e.g. exact qualifying criteria and payout quantum) were announced 
in end-March 2016 during Singapore’s annual Budget speech7. Eligible individuals receive 
quarterly payouts of S$300 – S$750, depending on the type of public housing (HDB) flat they 
live in8. Singaporeans who live in smaller flats will receive a larger payout, as flat-type is used 
                                                 
7 The Government first announced the introduction of the Silver Support Scheme (SSS) in August 2014, but details 
on qualifying criteria were not announced then. This implies that even if Singaporeans had some expectations 
about whether they would receive payouts from SSS, these expectations were probably weak.  
8 Most Singaporeans (80% as of 2016 – see Department of Statistics (2017)) live in high-rise public housing 
apartments (flats) purchased directly from the government, or in the resale market. These flats are often called 
HDB flats, after the statutory board (the Housing Development Board) that oversees public housing, and are 
categorised based on the number of rooms within each flat. The government often uses flat-type as a proxy for 
socio-economic status to target subsidies and transfers. In the case of the SSS, the payout quantum for individuals 
living in each type of flat is as follows. 1- and 2-room flats: S$750; 3-room flats: S$600; 4-room flats: S$450; 5-
room flats: S$300.  
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as a proxy for socioeconomic status. These payouts constitute a significant increase in 
permanent income, corresponding to 7% – 18% of mean monthly household expenditure 
among those who received SSS payouts in our sample, or 5 – 13% of labour income at the 20th 
percentile of full-time resident employees (Department of Statistics, 2016). On average, 
recipients of SSS payouts in our sample receive around S$500 per quarter. In the period we 
study, the first payout was made in end-July 2016, followed by another in end-September 
20169. We focus on the effects of the announcement and disbursement of these payouts in this 
study. 
Eligibility is automatically determined annually based on a combination of lifetime 
wages, housing type, housing ownership, and per-capita household income. To qualify, 
individuals must (i) have contributed no more than S$70,000 to their Central Provident Fund 
(CPF) accounts by age 5510; (ii) live in a 1- to 5-room HDB flat; (iii) not personally own or 
have a spouse who owns 5-room or larger HDB flats, private property, or multiple properties; 
and (iv) live in a household with a per-capita income of S$1,100 or below. They must also be 
Singapore citizens. For our study, receipt of Silver Support Scheme (SSS) payouts made in 
end-July and end-September 2016 can be seen as exogenous. This is because eligibility for the 
2016 payouts is based on government data available in 2015 (i.e. before the announcement of 
eligibility details in March 2016), and hence pre-determined. 
 Payments of the SSS payouts are credited to the bank accounts that Singaporeans have 
already registered with the government11. Those without a registered bank account will receive 
a cheque that is mailed to the residential address they registered with the government. If the 
cheque is not encashed or banked in within six months, the payouts will be credited into the 
                                                 
9 Payouts meant for the year 2017 and after will be made in end-December, end-March, end-June and end-
September, ahead of the start of each quarter. 
10 Self-employed persons should also have an average annual net trade income of not more than $22,800 when 
they were between the ages of 45 and 54. 
11 The Singapore government has a long history of giving out ad-hoc or regular cash transfers to Singaporeans, 
and hence has efficient systems in place that can be used to disburse any new types of cash transfers.  
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individuals’ CPF account, and can be subsequently withdrawn within a year. This disbursement 
set-up suggests that Singaporeans who are eligible for the SSS payouts will almost certainly 
receive their payouts. 
4 Data and variables 
4.1 Data source 
We use monthly data from waves 0 – 1712 (covering the period May 2015 – Dec 2016) 
of a large new longitudinal survey of elderly respondents in Singapore, the Singapore Life 
Panel (SLP)13. The SLP is run by the Centre for Research on the Economics of Ageing (CREA) 
at the Singapore Management University, and was designed in collaboration with the creators 
of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and its sister surveys, such as the American Life 
Panel. 15,000 Singapore citizens and permanent residents aged between 50 and 70, and their 
spouses, were initially recruited for a baseline survey in May – July 2015. Follow-up surveys 
were sent monthly. CREA has also put measures in place to limit attrition and ensure responses 
are population-representative14. These measures appear to have succeeded, as attrition has been 
low15, and comparison of SLP data to government statistics has shown that SLP data is 
population representative (Vaithianathan et al., 2017).  
There are several advantages to using this dataset for our study. First, the high frequency 
at which the survey is carried out allows us to time the effects of this permanent income shock 
(i.e. the Silver Support Scheme (SSS)) more precisely, compared to most other surveys which 
                                                 
12 Wave 0 refers to the baseline survey which was carried out during recruitment (between May – July 2015), 
while wave 1 was conducted in August 2015. Wave 17 was conducted in December 2016.  
13 See Vaithianathan et al. (2017) and https://crea.smu.edu.sg/singapore-monthly-panel for additional information 
on the SLP.  
14 For example, the surveys are available in all four major languages spoken by Singaporeans. In addition, while 
the surveys are conducted over the internet, respondents who are unable to understand the survey questions or 
who do not have access to the internet can answer the survey over the phone, or at centres set up at convenient 
locations around Singapore, where the survey will be conducted by trained interviewers. CREA also conducts 
ongoing campaigns to encourage participation.  
15 While not everyone responds to every survey wave, the number of participants who respond in any particular 
wave has remained stable at around 8,000. 
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are carried out at yearly or quarterly intervals. Second, the survey had been running for a few 
months before announcement of the SSS details, allowing us to separately identify the 
announcement and disbursement effects, as well as examine the credibility of our DiD 
identifying assumption. Third, as we will see later in this section, the SLP questions on 
subjective well-being go beyond the more commonly asked life satisfaction question, and 
include questions on narrower domains of subjective well-being such as satisfaction with one’s 
social life or household income, allowing us to study which of these narrower domains might 
drive changes in overall life satisfaction. Lastly, the richness of data in the SLP will also allow 
us to explore how responses to the SSS might vary among different segments of the population.  
4.2 Variables 
We focus our analysis on the effect of receiving a permanent income shock on subjective 
well-being, and restrict the sample for our main analysis to age-eligible respondents (aged 65 
and above in 2016) who are Singapore citizens and who live in public housing flats (as of 2016, 
about 80% of resident households live in public housing flats (Department of Statistics, 2017)). 
These are three out of the list of eligibility criteria that individuals must meet to qualify for SSS 
payouts in 2016. This sample includes individuals who receive SSS as well as those who do 
not. SSS recipients are identified using a deliberately timed quarterly question in the SLP which 
asks whether the respondent received SSS in the previous month; individuals who report 
receiving at least one out of the two payouts in 201616 are coded as SSS recipients. 
Apart from questions on treatment status, our dataset includes a rich set of baseline 
demographics (age, marital status, gender, ethnicity, education, housing type, number of 
household members, assets, and self-reported financial preparedness for retirement), as well as 
measures of different domains of evaluative subjective well-being, which will serve as our 
outcome variables.  
                                                 
16 Once in end-July 2016, and another in end-September 2016. 
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The subjective well-being variables include a broad measure of overall life satisfaction, 
as well as satisfaction within narrower domains such as household income; these variables are 
rated from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). Data on these are collected via the following questions: (i) 
“Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”; (ii) 
“How satisfied are you with your social contacts and family life?; (iii) “How satisfied are you 
with your daily activities, and if you are working, your job?”; (iv) “How satisfied are you with 
the total income of your household”; (v) “How satisfied are you with your overall economic 
situation?”; (vi) “How satisfied are you with your health”; and (vii) “Would you say your health 
is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” 17.  
To end off this section, we report summary statistics for the baseline demographics and 
subjective well-being outcomes for those who are age-eligible for the SSS (i.e. aged 65 and 
above in 2016), disaggregated by treatment status, in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
Focusing on the full age-eligible sample in Table 1, we can see that SSS recipients and non-
recipients differ in terms of several baseline characteristics. E.g., women are more likely to 
receive SSS, and SSS recipients report being less financially prepared for retirement than non-
SSS recipients.  
While these differences are relatively small in magnitude (judging by the normalised 
differences), and causal identification in our study relies on a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
strategy which allows for differences in baseline characteristics, one might be concerned that 
the treated and control groups are different enough that the DiD identifying assumption – 
parallel trends in the absence of treatment – might not hold. In Section 5, we discuss our 
methods for addressing this concern and explain Table 1 in greater detail.  
                                                 
17 Options for the first six questions are “very dissatisfied”, “dissatisfied”, “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”, 
“satisfied”, and “very satisfied”; options for the last question are “poor”, “fair”, “good”, “very good” and 
“excellent”. 
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5 Identification strategy and empirical model 
5.1 Identification strategy 
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to identify the average treatment-on-
treated (ATT) effect of receiving Silver Support Scheme (SSS) payouts on a broad range of 
subjective well-being domains. Our main analysis focuses on age-eligible individuals (aged 65 
and above in 2016) who are Singapore citizens and who live in public housing flats18.  These 
are three out of the list of eligibility criteria that individuals must meet to qualify for SSS 
payouts in 2016. This sample includes both SSS recipients (the treated group) and non-
recipients (the control group). Waves 0 – 8 (May 2015 – Mar 2016)19 make up the pre-
announcement period; waves 9 – 12 (Apr – Jul 2016) are the post-announcement and pre-
disbursement period; and waves 13 – 17 (Aug – Dec 2016) are the post-disbursement period. 
As we note in Section 4, the treated and control groups differ from each other in terms of 
several baseline characteristics. One might be concerned that differences between these groups 
could invalidate the DiD identifying assumption (i.e. outcomes in both groups follow the same 
trend in the absence of treatment).  
Our main strategy for addressing this concern is to construct a sample where the treatment 
and control groups are more similar. We start by using logistic regression to estimate the 
propensity score for receiving SSS payouts. The covariates are selected from a rich pool of key 
baseline demographic variables that could affect one’s eligibility for SSS payouts20.  Using the 
algorithm outlined in Imbens (2015), which proposes a data-driven way of selecting a subset 
of baseline covariates and their interactions, we select the following covariates and some of 
their interactions: age, marital status, gender, ethnicity, education, public housing flat type, 
whether respondent’s father is still living, number of household members, number of living 
                                                 
18 As of 2016, 80% of resident households live in public housing (Department of Statistics, 2017). 
19 Wave 0 covers May-Jul 2015. 
20 E.g. Total CPF contributions of not more than $70,000 by age 55, living in a household with per capita income 
of not more than $1,100  
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children, income of self and spouse, baseline self-assessment of financial preparedness for 
retirement and baseline satisfaction with one’s economic situation.  
We then trim the sample progressively at both extreme ends of the propensity score till 
the treated and control groups are more similar in terms of the baseline characteristics as well 
as pre-announcement time trends for our outcome variables. Figure 1 plots the unconditional 
mean of the life satisfaction variable across time, for four samples with different ranges of 
propensity score: (i) 0.00 to 1.00; (ii) 0.10 to 0.90; (iii) 0.15 to 0.85; and (iv) 0.20 to 0.80. As 
we restrict the sample to narrower ranges of propensity score, the pre-announcement time 
trends for the treated and control groups start to converge. For the smallest sample with 
propensity scores of 0.20 to 0.80, we see that the pre-announcement trends for the 
unconditional means are almost parallel. The same can be observed for other outcome variables 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  
We also see a noticeable improvement in the comparability of the treated and control 
groups in terms of baseline characteristics after trimming. The right panel in Table 1, which 
summarises statistics for the trimmed sample with propensity scores of 0.20 to 0.80, shows that 
differences in education, whether one lives in a 2-room flat, whether one owns a home, and 
perceived financial preparedness for retirement fall to statistical insignificance, and differences 
in all other variables shrink noticeably. All normalised differences21 in the trimmed sample 
also drop to 0.16 or less in absolute magnitude, well below the value of 0.3 which Imbens 
(2015) deems “modest”22.  In addition, Figure 4 shows that the distributions of key covariates 
related to SSS eligibility become more similar after trimming. Based on our above comparisons 
of baseline characteristics and pre-treatment trends across different samples and between the 
                                                 
21 Normalised differences are computed as in Imbens (2015), as the difference in means standardised by the square 
root of the mean variances of both groups. 
22 Table A1 in Appendix A compares the baseline characteristics for the treated and control groups for samples 
with propensity scores 0.10 to 0.90 and 0.15 to 0.85. The differences in means fall as we restrict the sample 
progressively. 
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treated and control groups, we deem it reasonable to use the sample with propensity scores 0.20 
to 0.80 for our main DiD analyses.  
While trimming the sample based on observables does not necessarily lead to 
comparability based on unobservables, it is unlikely that the remaining differences in 
unobservables will lead to a violation of the common trends assumption for DiD. Differences 
in unobservables could arguably be critical in the case where individuals self-select into the 
treatment group, but as we explained in Sections 1 and 3, the eligibility of individuals for the 
end-July and September payouts are predetermined before the announcement, and payouts are 
made automatically to all eligible individuals. In addition, the propensity score we use for 
trimming is also formulated based on variables that are related to individuals’ eligibility for the 
SSS payouts.  
In addition to the visual check of pre-announcement trends, we statistically test the DiD 
identifying assumption by adding pre-announcement leads to our regression specification. In 
the vast majority of the outcomes analysed, the coefficients of the pre-treatment leads are 
statistically insignificant, increasing the probability that our identifying assumption is valid. 
(The exceptions are pre-treatment leads for economic satisfaction and daily activities 
satisfaction which are significant in March -- the month of SSS announcement, though this 
could reflect early anticipation about the annual Budget announcements in general.)  
Beyond this, we carry out a battery of robustness checks (described more fully in Section 
7), which include checks that address potential violations of the parallel trends assumption in 
different ways. These checks include the addition of different group-specific time fixed effects 
and the use of different reweighting schemes to better match the treatment and control groups 
(e.g. using Abadie (2005)’s semi-parametric DiD on the full sample or matching-DiD using a 
1:1 nearest neighbour match). Our results are robust to this battery of checks – across the 
numerous checks we perform, the estimated magnitudes remain similar, and the effect of 
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receiving SSS remains statistically significant in all but two checks (where we lose significance 
due to a smaller sample size). 
Finally, we note that trimming our sample means that we identify the ATT for only a 
subset of those who are treated, if treatment effects are heterogeneous. However, we show in 
Section 7 that the ATT effects we estimate in our main specifications are close to those we 
estimate on the full sample (both with and without Abadie (2005)’s reweighting scheme23).   
5.2 Empirical specifications 
We start by estimating the following regression to study the overall effects of the Silver 
Support Scheme (SSS): 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑘
−1
𝑘=−3
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,𝑘) 
+𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡) + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡)   
+𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
(1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable for respondent 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
takes on value one if the individual ever received SSS payouts; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,−3, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,−2, 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,−1 are the pre-announcement leads (dummy variables that take value 1 if time t 
corresponds to January, February, and March 2016 respectively)24; 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏 is a dummy for 
the period between announcement and disbursement (waves 9 – 12, Apr – Jul 2016); 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏 
is a dummy for the period after disbursement (waves 13 – 17, Aug – Dec 2016) ; while 𝛼𝑖 and 
𝛾𝑡 are individual and time fixed-effects respectively. The suppressed period consists of waves 
0 to 5 (May/Jun/Jul – Dec 2015). Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  
                                                 
23 Abadie (2005)’s semi-parametric DiD involves weighting each control observation by their propensity score, 
and estimating the effects of receiving SSS using the full age-eligible sample. 
24 March 2016 is considered in the pre-announcement period as the announcement is made only towards the end 
of March. The survey wave in March would have closed before the announcement is made.  
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𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑘 test the assumption of common time trends statistically. Our identifying 
assumption will be more credible if the coefficients in 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒 are statistically insignificant. For 
the age-eligible sample, 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛 captures the announcement effect, and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏 captures the 
disbursement effect.  
Next, we modify equation (1) to study how treatment effects may vary by baseline 
financial preparedness for retirement and wealth: 
 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑘
−1
𝑘=−3
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,𝑘)  
+𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡) + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡)   
+𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓𝑖𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖)  
+ 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓𝑖𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖)  + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
(2) 
 
where 𝐹𝑖𝑛 can either be (i) a scale variable running from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) that measures 
subjective financial preparedness for retirement, or (ii) a scale variable running from 1(poorest) 
to 5(richest) in terms of pre-announcement assets quintile25. Financial preparedness for 
retirement can serve as a proxy for baseline assets levels, but it also contains additional 
information about an individual’s financial burden, as well as consumption and risk 
preferences. E.g. compared to another individual with the same level of wealth, a person with 
lower risk tolerance (and who would want to build up more savings for low probability adverse 
events) or who must support more dependents would be likely to report being less financially 
prepared for retirement. Taken together, these two sets of regressions will provide a fuller 
picture. 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓𝑖𝑛 capture heterogeneity in effects across either subjective financial 
preparedness for retirement or assets. 
                                                 
25 These asset quintiles are based on a sample that includes only those who are age-eligible (aged 65 and above in 
2016), and who live in public housing.  
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To the extent that financial preparation for retirement / wealth is correlated with flat-type, 
𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓𝑖𝑛 may also reflect the effects of differing payout levels, since payout levels 
are determined by the type of flat individuals live in. As such, we estimate another set of 
regressions which consider heterogeneity across Fin within each flat-type, to verify that our 
results from equation (2) indeed reflect heterogeneity in Fin, and not differing payout levels: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 
∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑘
−1
𝑘=−3
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,𝑘) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓
𝑓∈𝐹
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑓) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓,𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑓∈𝐹
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑓 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓
𝑓∈𝐹
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑓) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓,𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑓∈𝐹
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡 × 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑓 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖) 
+𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
(3) 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑓 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual lives in flat type f. F includes 
1/2- , 3-, 4-, 5-room and other flats26. 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑓,𝑓𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑓,𝑓𝑖𝑛 are our coefficients of interest.  
To investigate if responses may vary by whether an individual’s spouse receives SSS 
payouts, we restrict our sample to respondents who are married and estimate:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 
∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑘
−1
𝑘=−3
(𝐴𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡,𝑘) 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑔(𝑊ℎ𝑜_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑔 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡)
𝑔∈𝐺
  
(4) 
                                                 
26 Results for 1/2- and 5-room flats should be interpreted with caution, as relatively fewer people stay in these 
flat-types. We do not report results for the category “other flats” as it is made up of flats of unknown types. As 
we have already accounted for all flat-type categories in this specification, we exclude the interaction terms 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡  and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡  to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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+ ∑ 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑔(𝑊ℎ𝑜_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑔 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑡)
𝑔∈𝐺
 
+𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
 
where 𝐴𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if either respondent i or 
respondent i's spouse received SSS; 𝑊ℎ𝑜_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑔 can be a dummy variable indicating that 
(i) only the respondent received SSS; (ii) only the respondent’s spouse received SSS27; or (iii) 
both the respondent and his/her spouse received SSS. 𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛,𝑔 and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑔 reflect the 
heterogeneity of effects based on the identity of SSS recipients within a couple. E.g. 
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 will give the effect of only the respondent receiving SSS on his/her 
subjective well-being in the post-disbursement period28.  
6 Results 
6.1 Overall effects 
Table 3 reports the overall effect of receiving Silver Support Scheme (SSS) payouts on 
different domains of evaluative subjective well-being (specified at the top of each column). 
Coefficients for pre-announcement leads are generally statistically insignificant, providing 
evidence in favour of the DiD identifying assumption. The exceptions are leads for daily 
activities and economic satisfaction in March (the month of SSS announcement), which may 
reflect early anticipation about the annual Budget announcements in general, especially in the 
case of economic satisfaction.  
We find that the SSS, which amounts to around S$500 per quarter among recipients in 
our sample, leads to a statistically significant improvement in overall life satisfaction (column 
1). This improvement starts immediately upon SSS announcement, and does not increase 
                                                 
27 This variable is captured through a question in the SLP on whether a respondent’s spouse received SSS.  
28 The dynamics of how subjective well-being may change over time is interesting too. We estimated these 
regressions but do not observe any obvious patterns in the dynamics. This is not surprising as Frijters et al. (2011) 
find that the effects of an improvement in financial situation persists even up to 8 quarters after the event. In the 
interest of space, we will not report these results, though they are available on request.   
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further after disbursement starts (i.e. there is no significant difference between the 
annoucement and disbursement effects). Life satisfaction rises by 0.09 (about 2.5% of the 
baseline mean / 0.11SD) upon announcement of the SSS, and stays elevated at this level upon 
commencement of the SSS payouts (see Table 3). As one would expect, this rise in life 
satisfaction is at least partly driven by statistically significant increases in household income 
satisfaction (0.11, or 3.5% of the baseline mean / 0.13SD) and overall economic satisfaction 
(0.08, or 2.5% of the baseline mean / 0.10SD). In addition, there is some evidence of a 
marginally significant rise in social and family life satisfaction (0.07, or 1.9% of the baseline 
mean / 0.09SD). The coefficients of the treatment variables for health satisfaction and self-
rated health condition are positive but insignificant, suggesting that the SSS has little, if any, 
overall effect on health. Consistent with the predictions of the PIH (see e.g. Cai & Park, 2016), 
there is no additional increase in life satisfaction (and its sub-domains) upon disbursement of 
the payouts – the difference in magnitude between  𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛 and 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏 is small in magnitude and 
not statistically significant.  
The direction of our main life satisfaction result is consistent with other published papers 
that look at the causal effect of income on life satisfaction (e.g. Frijters et al., 2004; Frijters et 
al., 2006; Boyd-Swan et al., 2016; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016; Lachowska, 2016). In terms of 
magnitude, our main life satisfaction result is slightly smaller than the 0.17SD improvement in 
life satisfaction due to a large cash transfer29 in Kenya reported in Haushofer and Shapiro 
(2016). Compared to East Germans who experienced an approximate 25% rise in real 
household incomes between 1991 and 1995, our life satisfaction result appears slightly larger 
as East Germans experienced a corresponding increase of 1.4 – 2.2% of their 1990 mean life 
satisfaction (Frijters et al., 2004).  
                                                 
29 Between US$404 PPP to US$1,525 PPP was transferred to households in this experiment. The mean transfer 
was US$709 PPP, corresponding to almost two years of per-capita expenditure. 
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6.2 Heterogeneity by financial preparedness for retirement and assets 
The overall effects mask heterogeneity by subjective financial preparedness for 
retirement. Table 4 shows statistically significant evidence of variation by financial 
preparedness for retirement in life satisfaction, household income satisfaction, economic 
satisfaction, as well as self-rated health condition. Consistent with intuition, individuals who 
felt less financially prepared for retirement in the baseline experienced larger increases in 
subjective well-being from receiving SSS payouts; on average, a one-point decrease (on a 5-
point scale) in retirement preparedness increases the improvement in satisfaction from SSS 
payouts by about 0.06 to 0.08.   
In addition, once we allow for heterogeneous effects, the effect of SSS on health for those 
who are least prepared for retirement surfaces. E.g., self-rated health condition for those who 
are least prepared for retirement improved by 0.13 points30 during the post-disbursement period 
(5% of the mean, or 0.15SD). Our results are consistent with that of Jones and Schurer (2011), 
who also document heterogeneity in the effect of income on health, as well as past papers 
looking at the effect of income on health (Frijters et al., 2005; Behrman et al., 2011; Gunasekara 
et al., 2011).  
Financial preparedness for retirement, however, may be correlated with flat-type and thus 
payout quantum (payout levels are determined entirely by flat-type). This would imply that the 
variation we find above could be driven purely by the fact that less financially prepared 
individuals received a higher payout quantum. We verify that this is not the case in Table A2 
 of Appendix A, by investigating the existence of variation by financial preparedness within 
each flat-type. Generally, we still find that individuals who felt less financially prepared for 
retirement experienced larger increases in subjective well-being. 
                                                 
30 0.19 – 0.06 = 0.13 
22 
 
When we switch to heterogeneity by baseline asset quintiles in Table 5, we see that 
coefficients for interactions between the policy and asset variables are mostly insignificant and 
small in magnitude when compared to those for financial preparedness31. In all, the results in 
this sub-section suggest the marginal utility of income is decreasing in subjective financial 
preparedness for retirement, but the same extent of heterogeneity is not observed for net assets.  
There are a few potential explanations for this somewhat surprising result. First, 
subjective financial well-being may incorporate more information than objective measures of 
wealth, such as net assets. For example, subjective financial well-being is likely to capture 
information related to financial burden or differences in risk aversion, while net assets may not. 
For any given asset level, individuals with higher financial burden or risk aversion may be 
likely to benefit more from an increase in permanent income, due to an alleviation in financial 
burden and a decrease in the probability that retirement income will be insufficient in future 
respectively, and may be a reason why we observe more heterogeneity in responses by 
subjective financial preparedness for retirement.  
Second, survey respondents may be more likely to give accurate answers to subjective 
financial preparedness for retirement than net assets. This potentially greater mismeasurement 
in net assets may then contribute to the lower heterogeneity in responses we observe for net 
assets.  
Regardless of the potential explanations, our results in this section suggest that perceived 
financial well-being could be more important than net assets, as a summary measure, in 
understanding how individuals’ utility change in response to income, at least among the age 
and socioeconomic group we study. As this result may have implications for the welfare effects 
                                                 
31 We obtain similar results when we use baseline asset deciles instead of quintiles, and when we use non-housing 
assets instead of total assets (results available upon request).  
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of income transfers and how policymakers should target income transfers, it would be 
interesting to see if this result holds up in different contexts in future studies.  
6.3 Effect of spousal receipt of SSS 
Finally, we report results on how spousal receipt of SSS payouts may affect subjective 
well-being. Results in Table 6 are based only on married respondents. Our first result is 
intuitive: subjective well-being rises slightly more if both the respondent and his/her spouse 
received SSS payouts, compared to the case where only the respondent received SSS. E.g., life 
satisfaction increases by 0.12 if only the respondent received SSS, and it increases by an 
additional 0.03 if both the respondent and his/her spouse receive SSS. When only the 
respondent’s spouse received SSS payouts, the respondent’s well-being does not appear to 
increase by much: the results are statistically insignificant across all domains of subjective 
well-being.  
Our results suggest that having only a spouse receive SSS payouts does not improve a 
respondent’s subjective well-being by much (if at all), and are consistent with a scenario of 
limited income pooling within the household. These results are also consistent with findings 
from past papers that focus on testing the unitary household model and the income pooling 
property using different outcome variables (see Donni and Chiappori (2011) for a review)32. 
7 Robustness Checks 
The overall impact of the SSS on each outcome we analyse is subjected to the following 
battery of robustness checks based on modifications of equation (1): 
1. Removal of pre-announcement leads to verify that results are robust to changes in baseline 
period definition. 
                                                 
32 While we note that our results are consistent with a scenario of limited income pooling, we acknowledge that 
more work will need to be done if we wish to make a more definitive statement regarding the unitary household 
model. Such work, however, is beyond the scope of our current paper. Separately, we look at whether the effect 
of receiving SSS varies by gender as well, and find no evidence that it does (results available on request).  
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2. Restriction of sample to a “balanced” panel, where every individual has at least one 
observation in each of the pre-announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post 
disbursement periods, to verify that compositional changes in respondents across waves are 
not driving our results.  
3. Addition of ethnicity- and flat-type-specific time fixed effects, to allow for differential time 
trends in different groups. 
4. Addition of controls for additional welfare payments: whether the respondent received the 
Workfare Income Supplement (a wage subsidy) or GST vouchers (a modest one-off cash 
transfer)33. 
5. Estimating the effects of SSS using Abadie (2005)’s semiparametric DiD34 and DiD 
matching using a 1-1 nearest neighbour match based on the propensity of receiving SSS35, 
to verify that our results are robust to different methods of addressing imbalances in 
baseline characteristics that may affect the parallel trends assumption.  
We find that our results are robust to the battery of checks we carry out. Table A3 to 
Table A6 in Appendix A report the results of these robustness checks for outcomes that show 
an overall response to receipt of SSS: life, social, household income, and economic 
satisfaction36. The estimated effect of receiving SSS payouts remains significant across almost 
all our robustness checks, except for two checks in social satisfaction, where we lose 
                                                 
33 We do not include controls for additional welfare payments in our main specification as these questions are 
only asked quarterly, so not all respondents reply to these questions. Including these controls in our main 
specification will reduce our sample size and reduce statistical power considerably.  
34 This method addresses the imbalance of baseline characteristics between the treated and control groups by 
reweighting control observations based on their propensity score; control observations with a higher propensity 
score are given a higher weight. We use the Stata package absdid described in Houngbedji (2015) to implement 
this estimator. 
35 This method addresses the same issue – imbalance in baseline covariates that might be correlated with trends – 
that Abadie (2005) and our main strategy tries to address. We match each treated individual to a control individual 
based on a nearest neighbor match using the propensity score, compute the DiD for each pair, then aggregate these 
results to obtain the impact of SSS receipt. We compute p-values using a permutation test, using methods similar 
to those described in Abadie et al. (2010), Robbins et al. (2016), and Chang and Lee (2011).  
36 Results for other outcomes are available upon request. 
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significance due to the smaller sample used in those checks. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients remains quite stable across different checks for each outcome variable.  
In addition, the estimated effect of receiving SSS from using Abadie (2005)’s semi-
parametric DiD on the full/untrimmed sample (in column (6) of Table A3 to Table A6) are 
similar in magnitude to those from our trimmed sample, providing evidence that estimated 
ATTs from our trimmed and full sample are likely to be similar. We also present results from 
our full sample estimated using Equation (1) in Table A7. The estimated SSS effects are 
generally similar. 
8 Conclusion  
In this paper, we use a DiD strategy to study the causal effect of a permanent income 
increase on a broad range of satisfaction domains. The source of exogenous variation comes 
from a new national means-tested non-contributory pension in Singapore, the Silver Support 
Scheme (SSS), for which eligibility is pre-determined and payouts to all eligible individuals 
are disbursed automatically. Using a new monthly longitudinal dataset of elderly Singaporeans, 
we precisely time and estimate the SSS announcement and disbursement effects. We find that 
announcement effects are important: life satisfaction rises among recipients by about 0.11SD 
upon SSS announcement, and this rise is sustained (but does not increase further) after 
disbursement of the payouts. This improvement appears to be driven by social, household 
income, and economic satisfaction. Consistent with the predictions of the PIH (see e.g. Cai & 
Park, 2016), there is no additional effect upon disbursement – the difference between the 
announcement and disbursement effects is small and statistically insignificant.  
We also explore heterogeneity in the marginal utility of income. Consistent with 
intuition, recipients who reported being less financially prepared for retirement exhibited larger 
increases in well-being. Surprisingly, an analysis of how marginal utility of income varies by 
net assets shows little evidence of such heterogeneity, suggesting that subjective financial well-
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being may be more important than net assets in understanding how the marginal utility of 
income varies, at least among the age and socioeconomic group we study. In addition, once we 
account for heterogeneity, we discover that the self-rated health condition of those who are 
least financially prepared for retirement improved. Lastly, we find that well-being improved 
negligibly when an individual’s spouse received SSS payouts while he/she did not, a result that 
is consistent with limited income pooling within the household.  
Our findings add to the literature on the effect of income on subjective well-being, by 
separately estimating the announcement and disbursement effects of income on subjective 
well-being. We also document the presence of heterogeneity in responses to the SSS, which 
suggests that future policies designed with greater consideration of heterogeneity among 
individuals could reap higher welfare gains. One surprising result is that subjective financial 
well-being may be more important than net assets in understanding how marginal utility of 
income varies. It would be interesting to see if this result holds up in different contexts in future 
studies, as such a result may have implications for the welfare effects and targeting of income 
transfers. Lastly, our results also strengthen the evidence on the effects of non-contributory 
pensions on subjective well-being, and of income on health. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for baseline demographics 
  Full age-eligible sample  Trimmed sample (propensity score 0.2 – 0.8) 
 Received SS  
(N1=429) 
 No SS 
(N1=1,242) 
 Norm 
diff2 
Diff in 
means3 
 Received SS  
(N1=324) 
 
No SS 
(N1=580) 
 Norm 
diff2 
Diff in 
means3 
  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD  Mean SD  
Age at 2016 68.86 3.32  68.04 2.66  0.27 0.83***  69.05 3.36  68.67 2.86  0.12 0.39* 
Married 0.69 0.46  0.77 0.42  -0.18 -0.08***  0.66 0.47  0.73 0.45  -0.15 -0.07** 
Male  0.40 0.49  0.54 0.50  -0.29 -0.15***  0.35 0.48  0.40 0.49  -0.11 -0.05 
                  
Chinese  0.87 0.33  0.87 0.34  0.00 0.00  0.87 0.34  0.90 0.30  -0.10 -0.03 
Malay 0.07 0.25  0.07 0.25  0.00 0.00  0.07 0.25  0.06 0.24  0.03 0.01 
Indian 0.05 0.22  0.05 0.22  0.01 0.00  0.05 0.22  0.03 0.18  0.09 0.02 
                  
No formal schooling 0.17 0.38  0.12 0.33  0.13 0.05**  0.17 0.38  0.16 0.36  0.05 0.02 
Primary schooling 0.35 0.48  0.26 0.44  0.20 0.09***  0.41 0.49  0.37 0.48  0.07 0.04 
Secondary schooling 0.36 0.48  0.41 0.49  -0.10 -0.05*  0.35 0.48  0.36 0.48  -0.01 -0.01 
                  
Lives in 1-room flat 0.05 0.22  0.01 0.11  0.22 0.04***  0.05 0.22  0.02 0.15  0.15 0.03** 
Lives in 2-room flat 0.05 0.22  0.02 0.15  0.15 0.03**  0.05 0.22  0.03 0.17  0.11 0.02 
Lives in 3-room flat 0.33 0.47  0.21 0.40  0.27 0.12***  0.39 0.49  0.32 0.47  0.16 0.07** 
Lives in 4-room flat 0.36 0.48  0.37 0.48  -0.03 -0.01  0.36 0.48  0.42 0.49  -0.11 -0.05 
Lives in 5-room flat 0.16 0.37  0.29 0.45  -0.32 -0.13***  0.10 0.30  0.15 0.36  -0.15 -0.05** 
Owns home 0.83 0.38  0.88 0.33  -0.15 -0.05**  0.82 0.38  0.84 0.37  -0.05 -0.02 
                  
No. of hh members 2.95 1.49  3.27 1.51  -0.21 -0.32***  2.82 1.42  3.05 1.43  -0.16 -0.23** 
No. of total children 2.18 1.43  2.15 1.25  0.02 0.03  2.16 1.47  2.21 1.31  -0.03 -0.05 
Retirement 
preparedness4  
2.17 0.90  2.33 0.88  -0.19 -0.17***  2.13 0.90  2.14 0.83  -0.02 -0.01 
Notes: 
1 N refers to number of respondents. 
2 Normalised differences are computed as in Imbens (2015) (as the difference in means standardised by the square root of the mean variance of both groups) 
3 ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
4 This is a self-assessment on preparedness for retirement, captured on a scale of 1 to 5, with a higher value representing greater preparedness. This was captured 
during the baseline survey, which was conducted before the announcement of details on the Silver Support Scheme. 
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 Table 2: Summary statistics for pre-announcement dependent variables1  
(Trimmed sample with 0.20-0.80 propensity score) 
 
  Age-eligible for Silver Support (age 65 and above) 
 Received SS  Didn't receive SS 
 N2 Mean SD  N2 Mean SD 
Life satisfaction 1,947 3.51 0.80  3,593 3.54 0.78 
Social / family satisfaction  1,944 3.65 0.74  3,594 3.66 0.71 
Daily activities satisfaction  1,622 3.52 0.73  3,009 3.47 0.79 
Household income satisfaction 1,944 3.18 0.86  3,591 3.19 0.84 
Economic satisfaction 1,948 3.19 0.85  3,591 3.21 0.83 
Health satisfaction 1,947 3.26 0.90  3,594 3.29 0.91 
Self-rated health condition  1,947 2.52 0.89  3,592 2.60 0.88 
Notes:  
1 These variables are rated from 1(worst) to 5(best). Options for the first 6 variables are “very dissatisfied”, 
“dissatisfied”, “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”, “satisfied”, and “very satisfied”, while the options for the 
last question are “poor”, “fair”, “good”, “very good” and “excellent”.  
2 N refers to the number of observations at the respondent-wave level. 
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Table 3: Overall impact of the Silver Support Scheme on subjective well-being  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Life 
satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily 
activities 
satisfn 
HH 
income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health 
cond 
        
Received SS  Jan  0.0428 0.0378 0.00955 0.0121 -0.00109 -0.00428 -0.00601 
 (0.0427) (0.0403) (0.0421) (0.0418) (0.0416) (0.0436) (0.0446) 
Received SS  Feb 0.0165 -0.0116 0.0345 0.0719 0.0631 0.0425 0.0266 
 (0.0435) (0.0427) (0.0474) (0.0491) (0.0476) (0.0463) (0.0462) 
Received SS  Mar  0.0705 0.0174 0.0949** 0.0718 0.109** 0.0635 0.0721 
 (0.0437) (0.0410) (0.0450) (0.0454) (0.0467) (0.0508) (0.0448) 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0858** 0.0643* 0.0226 0.0851** 0.0661* -0.00177 0.0194 
 (0.0359) (0.0328) (0.0352) (0.0368) (0.0349) (0.0366) (0.0352) 
Received SS   
post- disb 0.0892** 0.0695* 0.0549 0.113*** 0.0825** 0.0383 0.0556 
 (0.0409) (0.0366) (0.0400) (0.0391) (0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0380) 
        
        
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 12,652 12,651 11,742 12,646 12,650 12,651 12,649 
R-squared 0.675 0.659 0.691 0.688 0.685 0.727 0.711 
        
P-values for 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏−𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛 (i.e. test of whether 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑏−𝛽𝑎𝑛𝑛 is statistically different from zero) 
p-values 0.887 0.819 0.177 0.295 0.522 0.138 0.198 
        
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst 
(“very dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for 
SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8. 
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for 
respondents who received SSS payouts.  
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Table 4: Heterogeneous effects of SSS payouts by financial preparation for retirement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Life 
satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily 
activities  
satisfn 
HH 
income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health cond 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.164** 0.0459 0.0171 0.176** 0.123* 0.0653 0.160** 
 (0.0687) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0700) (0.0629) (0.0676) (0.0674) 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.257*** 0.0543 0.0793 0.246*** 0.226*** 0.130* 0.194*** 
 (0.0846) (0.0732) (0.0799) (0.0785) (0.0770) (0.0721) (0.0733) 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 
retirement prep -0.0372 0.00876 0.00254 -0.0434* -0.0271 -0.0319 -0.0671*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0221) (0.0207) (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0260) (0.0257) 
Received SS   
post-disb 
retirement prep -0.0793** 0.00722 -0.0115 -0.0631** -0.0677** -0.0434 -0.0655** 
 (0.0310) (0.0274) (0.0295) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0273) (0.0302) 
        
Leads significant? NO NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO NO 
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 12,652 12,651 11,742 12,646 12,650 12,651 12,649 
R-squared 0.675 0.659 0.691 0.689 0.686 0.728 0.712 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst 
(“very dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(2), where announcement and disbursement variables are also interacted 
with one’s self-assessed financial preparedness for retirement, which is rated from 1(Poor) to 5(Excellent). The 
sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), live in public 
housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8. 
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for 
respondents who received SSS payouts.  
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Table 5: Heterogeneous effects of SSS payouts by baseline assets quintile  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Life 
satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily 
activities  
satisfn 
HH 
income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health cond 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0840 0.0484 0.0644 0.0966* 0.0566 0.0363 0.0794 
 (0.0561) (0.0495) (0.0511) (0.0572) (0.0548) (0.0597) (0.0543) 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.0723 0.0224 0.0621 0.0714 0.0711 0.0742 0.130** 
 (0.0660) (0.0603) (0.0602) (0.0631) (0.0580) (0.0595) (0.0651) 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 
assets quintile 0.00130 0.00905 -0.0131 -0.00727 0.00275 -0.0147 -0.0243 
 (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0172) 
Received SS   
post-disb  
assets quintile 0.00455 0.0157 -0.00118 0.0117 0.00362 -0.0185 -0.0326* 
 (0.0188) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0193) 
        
Leads significant? NO NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO NO 
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 11,893 11,892 11,092 11,887 11,892 11,892 11,892 
R-squared 0.685 0.665 0.694 0.695 0.692 0.736 0.722 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst 
(“very dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(2), where announcement and disbursement variables are also interacted 
with one’s net assets (captured before announcement and expressed in quintiles which are computed off respondents 
who are aged 65 in 2016 and who live in public housing flats). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-
eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 
0.8. This sample is smaller because data on assets was collected only once before announcement, and not everyone 
responded in that wave.  
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for 
respondents who received SSS payouts.  
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Table 6: Effects of spousal receipt of SSS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Life 
satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily 
activities  
satisfn 
HH 
income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health 
cond 
        
Only respondent rcv 
SS  announce-to-disb 0.139*** 0.105** 0.0695 0.144** 0.112** 0.0933 0.0118 
 (0.0493) (0.0484) (0.0564) (0.0608) (0.0554) (0.0631) (0.0628) 
Only respondent rcv 
SS  post-disb 0.116* 0.127** 0.0571 0.167*** 0.0853 0.0832 0.0682 
 (0.0622) (0.0569) (0.0674) (0.0625) (0.0644) (0.0737) (0.0708) 
        
Only spouse rcv SS  
announce-to-disb 0.0216 0.0115 0.0168 0.0991 0.118 -0.0274 -0.0940 
 (0.0705) (0.0616) (0.0681) (0.0718) (0.0766) (0.0682) (0.0758) 
Only spouse rcv SS  
post-disb 0.0226 0.0490 0.0380 0.0101 -0.00816 -0.00773 0.0348 
 (0.0729) (0.0636) (0.0765) (0.0915) (0.0774) (0.0799) (0.0754) 
        
Both rcv SS  
announce-to-disb 0.0827 0.0877* -0.00178 0.0615 0.0801 -0.00784 0.0191 
 (0.0583) (0.0484) (0.0556) (0.0584) (0.0542) (0.0542) (0.0497) 
Both rcv SS  
 post-disb 0.146** 0.136** 0.0928 0.134** 0.146*** 0.0407 0.0775 
 (0.0661) (0.0537) (0.0631) (0.0597) (0.0556) (0.0562) (0.0555) 
        
Leads significant? NO 
YES 
(MAR*) 
NO 
YES  
(FEB*) 
NO NO NO 
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 8,701 8,700 8,080 8,695 8,699 8,702 8,698 
R-squared 0.679 0.670 0.697 0.697 0.704 0.723 0.706 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very 
dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(4), where announcement and disbursement variables are also interacted 
with the identity of recipient. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and 
above in 2016), live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8. This sample is smaller because 
only respondents who are married are included.  
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for 
respondents who received SSS payouts.  
 
  
36 
 
 
Figure 1: Trends for life satisfaction, for samples trimmed based on increasingly narrower 
ranges of propensity score 
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Figure 2: Trends for life, social, and daily activities satisfaction39 
  
                                                 
39 The periods to the left of the first and second dotted vertical lines refer to the pre-announcement and pre-
disbursement periods respectively.  
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Figure 3: Trends for household income, economic, health satisfaction as well as health condition40
                                                 
40 The periods to the left of the first and second dotted vertical lines refer to the pre-announcement and pre-
disbursement periods respectively.  
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Before trimming After trimming 
  
  
  
  
Figure 4: Density plots / histograms of key demographics before (left panel) and after (right panel) 
trimming41 
                                                 
41 Note the change in scale of the horizontal axis after trimming. 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
D
e
n
s
it
y
60 70 80 90 100
Age as of 2016 0% to 100%
received SS control
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
60 70 80 90 100
Age as of 2016 20% to 80%
received SS control
0
.0
0
0
5
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
5
.0
0
2
.0
0
2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Income from work 0% to 100%
received SS control
0
.0
0
0
5
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
5
.0
0
2
.0
0
2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Income from work 20% to 80%
received SS control
0
5
.0
0
0
e
-0
7
1
.0
0
0
e
-0
6
1
.5
0
0
e
-0
6
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5000000 10000000 15000000
Assets 0% to 100%
received SS control
0
5
.0
0
0
e
-0
7
1
.0
0
0
e
-0
6
1
.5
0
0
e
-0
6
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 2000000 4000000 6000000 8000000
Assets 20% to 80%
received SS control
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
0 1
D
e
n
s
it
y
economic situation satisfaction
Graphs by Resp self-report ever received SS
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
0 1
D
e
n
s
it
y
economic situation satisfaction
Graphs by Resp self-report ever received SS
40 
 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1: Summary statistics for baseline demographics  
 Trimmed sample (propensity score 0.10 – 0.90)  Trimmed sample (propensity score 0.15 – 0.85) 
 Received SS  
(N1=406) 
 No SS 
(N1=929) 
 Norm 
diff2 
Diff in 
means3 
 Received SS  
(N1=369) 
 
No SS 
(N1=739) 
 Norm 
diff2 
Diff in 
means3 
  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD  Mean SD  
Age at 2016 68.93 3.37  68.40 2.72  0.17 0.52***  68.95 3.32  68.55 2.74  0.13 0.40** 
Married 0.68 0.47  0.75 0.43  -0.16 -0.07***  0.67 0.47  0.74 0.44  -0.16 -0.07** 
Male  0.38 0.49  0.48 0.50  -0.21 -0.10***  0.36 0.48  0.44 0.50  -0.15 -0.08** 
                  
Chinese  0.87 0.33  0.89 0.31  -0.06 -0.02  0.87 0.34  0.89 0.31  -0.08 -0.03 
Malay 0.07 0.25  0.06 0.23  0.04 0.01  0.07 0.25  0.06 0.24  0.03 0.01 
Indian 0.05 0.22  0.05 0.21  0.02 0.00  0.05 0.23  0.04 0.20  0.06 0.01 
                  
No formal schooling 0.17 0.38  0.14 0.35  0.10 0.04  0.18 0.38  0.15 0.36  0.06 0.02 
Primary schooling 0.36 0.48  0.32 0.47  0.08 0.04  0.38 0.49  0.35 0.48  0.06 0.03 
Secondary schooling 0.37 0.48  0.38 0.48  -0.02 -0.01  0.35 0.48  0.36 0.48  -0.02 -0.01 
                  
Lives in 1-room flat 0.05 0.22  0.02 0.13  0.20 0.04***  0.05 0.22  0.02 0.14  0.17 0.03** 
Lives in 2-room flat 0.05 0.21  0.02 0.16  0.12 0.02*  0.05 0.22  0.03 0.16  0.11 0.02* 
Lives in 3-room flat 0.34 0.47  0.25 0.43  0.20 0.09***  0.36 0.48  0.29 0.45  0.16 0.07** 
Lives in 4-room flat 0.36 0.48  0.40 0.49  -0.09 -0.04  0.37 0.48  0.41 0.49  -0.08 -0.04 
Lives in 5-room flat 0.15 0.36  0.23 0.42  -0.21 -0.08***  0.13 0.34  0.19 0.39  -0.17 -0.06*** 
Owns home 0.83 0.38  0.87 0.34  -0.11 -0.04*  0.82 0.38  0.86 0.35  -0.10 -0.04 
                  
No. of hh members 2.91 1.47  3.16 1.43  -0.17 -0.24***  2.85 1.42  3.12 1.42  -0.19 -0.27*** 
No. of total children 2.18 1.42  2.18 1.26  0.00 0.00  2.19 1.45  2.22 1.29  -0.03 -0.03 
Retirement 
preparedness4  2.15 0.91 
 
2.26 0.85 
 
-0.13 -0.11** 
 
2.12 0.89 
 
2.23 0.86 
 
-0.12 -0.10* 
Notes: 
1 N refers to number of respondents. 
2 Normalised differences are computed as in Imbens (2015) (as the difference in means standardised by the square root of the mean variance of both groups) 
3 ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
4 This is a self-assessment on preparedness for retirement, captured on a scale of 1 to 5, with a higher value representing greater preparedness. This was captured 
during the baseline survey, which was conducted before the announcement of details on the Silver Support Scheme. 
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Table A2: Silver Support payouts and subjective well-being – heterogeneous effects by flat-type 
and financial preparedness for retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Life satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily activities  
satisfn 
HH income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health cond 
Received SS  ann-to-
disb  1/2 rm  
retirement prep -0.103* -0.0445 0.0342 0.0312 0.0600 -0.160 -0.0596 
 (0.0556) (0.120) (0.0519) (0.128) (0.0980) (0.125) (0.0735) 
Received SS   
ann-to- disb  3 rm  
retirement prep -0.0301 -0.00160 0.0371 -0.0676* -0.0445 -0.0596 -0.143*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0353) (0.0418) (0.0364) (0.0386) (0.0534) (0.0472) 
Received SS   
ann-to- disb  4 rm  
retirement prep -0.0868** 0.00709 -0.0593* -0.0917** -0.0573 0.0361 -0.00271 
 (0.0405) (0.0397) (0.0349) (0.0447) (0.0455) (0.0338) (0.0506) 
Received SS   
ann-to- disb  5 rm  
retirement prep 0.0663 0.0496 0.0639 0.0330 0.000767 0.0202 -0.0171 
 (0.0666) (0.0477) (0.0392) (0.0469) (0.0414) (0.0411) (0.0284) 
Received SS   
post- disb  1/2 rm  
retirement prep -0.173* -0.0415 0.0505 -0.0343 -0.0397 -0.219** -0.133 
 (0.0991) (0.117) (0.0873) (0.102) (0.0778) (0.101) (0.106) 
Received SS   
post- disb  3 rm  
retirement prep -0.0796* -0.0646 0.0262 -0.116** -0.126** -0.0529 -0.125** 
 (0.0467) (0.0472) (0.0458) (0.0452) (0.0493) (0.0435) (0.0489) 
Received SS   
post- disb  4 rm  
retirement prep -0.116** 0.0363 -0.0966** -0.117** -0.107** -0.00333 -0.0288 
 (0.0499) (0.0470) (0.0468) (0.0467) (0.0499) (0.0468) (0.0553) 
Received SS   
post- disb  5 rm  
retirement prep 0.0645 0.0640 0.137*** 0.111 0.0982 0.0549 -0.00343 
 (0.0681) (0.0534) (0.0528) (0.0752) (0.0676) (0.0591) (0.0689) 
Leads significant?  NO NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO 
YES 
(MAR**) 
NO NO 
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 12,652 12,651 11,742 12,646 12,650 12,651 12,649 
R-squared 0.677 0.660 0.692 0.689 0.687 0.728 0.713 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very 
dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(3), where announcement and disbursement variables are interacted not only with 
one’s self-assessed financial preparedness for retirement (which is rated from 1(Poor) to 5(Excellent)) but also flat-type . 
The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), live in public housing 
flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8. 
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for respondents 
who received SSS payouts.  
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Table A3: Robustness checks for overall life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic 
trends 
Flattype 
trends 
WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 
matching 
        
Received SS  Jan  - 0.0360 0.0376 0.0294 0.0274 0.0283 - 
  (0.0422) (0.0422) (0.0417) (0.0467) (0.0345)  
Received SS  Feb - 0.0111 0.0147 0.00407 0.0158 -0.0281 - 
  (0.0435) (0.0438) (0.0436) (0.0468) (0.0399)  
Received SS  Mar  - 0.0645 0.0691 0.0735* 0.0499 0.0375 - 
  (0.0437) (0.0443) (0.0430) (0.0471) (0.0368)  
        
Received SS  Jan - 
Mar  - - - - - - 0.0201 
       P=0.58 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0685** 0.0819** 0.0841** 0.0729** 0.0911** 0.0460 0.0530 
 (0.0289) (0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0352) (0.0412) (0.0301) P=0.11 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.0719** 0.0824** 0.0858** 0.0762* 0.0938** 0.0831** 0.0681* 
 (0.0345) (0.0409) (0.0413) (0.0401) (0.0475) (0.0343) P=0.07 
        
Observations 12,652 12,519 12,652 12,652 9,959 1,592 648 
R-squared 0.675 0.679 0.677 0.678 0.693 - - 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (SE) clustered at the household level in parentheses for columns (1) – (6); SE adjusted to account for 
uncertainty from propensity score estimation as in Abadie (2005) for column (7); p-values from a permutation test in 
parentheses in column (8). ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
2 The dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very dissatisfied”) and 5 the best (“very 
satisfied”). 
3 Columns (1) – (7) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead 
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time fixed 
effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare 
Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller because this data is not collected every wave and not 
everyone responds every wave; (6) reweighting each observation by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); 
(7) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match. Eq(1) describes the baseline model used in these checks. The sample 
is restricted to those age-eligible for the Silver Support Scheme (i.e. aged 65 and above) as of end-Sep 2016 (the month of 
the most recent Silver Support payout in our data), and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8 for checks in columns (1) – (5). 
The full/untrimmed sample is used in column (6). The number of observations in columns (1) – (5) refer to the number of 
individual-month observations; those in columns (6) and (7) refer to number of respondents. 
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Table A4: Robustness checks for social and family life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic 
trends 
Flattype 
trends 
WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 
matching 
        
Received SS  Jan  - 0.0322 0.0296 0.0345 0.0263 0.00710 - 
  (0.0398) (0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0426) (0.0337)  
Received SS  Feb - -0.0125 -0.0170 -0.00839 0.00159 -0.0488 - 
  (0.0428) (0.0423) (0.0434) (0.0455) (0.0404)  
Received SS  Mar  - 0.0153 0.0113 0.0223 -0.00389 -0.0129 - 
  (0.0410) (0.0407) (0.0401) (0.0438) (0.0353)  
        
Received SS  Jan - 
Mar  - - - - - - -0.0254 
       P=0.44 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0581** 0.0632* 0.0594* 0.0570* 0.0667* 0.00651 0.0141 
 (0.0264) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0367) (0.0299) P=0.62 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.0633** 0.0675* 0.0633* 0.0627* 0.0498 0.0523* 0.0458 
 (0.0312) (0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0420) (0.0313) P=0.17 
        
Observations 12,651 12,518 12,651 12,651 9,959 1,592 648 
R-squared 0.659 0.661 0.661 0.662 0.677 - - 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (SE) clustered at the household level in parentheses for columns (1) – (6); SE adjusted to account for 
uncertainty from propensity score estimation as in Abadie (2005) for column (7); p-values from a permutation test in 
parentheses in column (8). ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
2 The dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very dissatisfied”) and 5 the best (“very 
satisfied”). 
3 Columns (1) – (7) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead 
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time 
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding receipt of additional welfare payments 
(Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller because this data is not collected every 
wave and not everyone responds every wave; (6) reweighting each observation by their propensity of receiving SSS as in 
Abadie (2005); (7) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match. Eq(1) describes the baseline model used in these 
checks. The sample is restricted to those age-eligible for the Silver Support Scheme (i.e. aged 65 and above) as of end-Sep 
2016 (the month of the most recent Silver Support payout in our data), and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8 for checks 
in columns (1) – (5). The full/untrimmed sample is used in column (6). The number of observations in columns (1) – (5) 
refer to the number of individual-month observations; those in columns (6) and (7) refer to number of respondents. 
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Table A5: Robustness checks for household income satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic 
trends 
Flattype 
trends 
WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 
matching 
        
Received SS  Jan  - 0.00623 0.00205 0.0122 -0.0286 0.0394 - 
  (0.0413) (0.0419) (0.0412) (0.0454) (0.0350)  
Received SS  Feb - 0.0714 0.0621 0.0789* 0.0672 0.0484 - 
  (0.0491) (0.0490) (0.0473) (0.0521) (0.0393)  
Received SS  Mar  - 0.0681 0.0579 0.0718 0.0580 0.0675* - 
  (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0449) (0.0499) (0.0388)  
        
Received SS  Jan - 
Mar  - - - - - - 0.0324 
       P=0.36 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0654** 0.0865** 0.0753** 0.0823** 0.0931** 0.0623* 0.0712** 
 (0.0304) (0.0369) (0.0371) (0.0367) (0.0405) (0.0321) P=0.05 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.0929*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0393) (0.0392) (0.0389) (0.0437) (0.0332) P=0.01 
        
Observations 12,646 12,506 12,646 12,646 9,953 1,590 648 
R-squared 0.688 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.710 - - 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (SE) clustered at the household level in parentheses for columns (1) – (6); SE adjusted to account for 
uncertainty from propensity score estimation as in Abadie (2005) for column (7); p-values from a permutation test in 
parentheses in column (8). ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
2 The dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very dissatisfied”) and 5 the best (“very 
satisfied”). 
3 Columns (1) – (7) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead terms; 
(2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-announcement, 
announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time fixed effects; (4) 
allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income 
Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone 
responds every wave; (6) reweighting each observation by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); (7) DiD 
matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match. Eq(1) describes the baseline model used in these checks. The sample is restricted 
to those age-eligible for the Silver Support Scheme (i.e. aged 65 and above) as of end-Sep 2016 (the month of the most recent 
Silver Support payout in our data), and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8 for checks in columns (1) – (5). The full/untrimmed 
sample is used in column (6). The number of observations in columns (1) – (5) refer to the number of individual-month 
observations; those in columns (6) and (7) refer to number of respondents. 
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Table A6: Robustness checks for economic satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic 
trends 
Flattype 
trends 
WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 
matching 
        
Received SS  Jan  - -0.00844 -0.00825 -0.00151 -0.0306 0.0241 - 
  (0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0454) (0.0396)  
Received SS  Feb - 0.0610 0.0517 0.0588 0.0455 0.0382 - 
  (0.0475) (0.0480) (0.0470) (0.0515) (0.0412)  
Received SS  Mar  - 0.106** 0.102** 0.108** 0.119** 0.0691* - 
  (0.0468) (0.0477) (0.0465) (0.0523) (0.0394)  
        
Received SS  Jan - 
Mar  - - - - - - 0.0306 
       P=0.40 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0443 0.0665* 0.0601* 0.0588* 0.0754* 0.0267 0.0454 
 (0.0281) (0.0350) (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0399) (0.0307) P=0.21 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.0608* 0.0854** 0.0787** 0.0706* 0.105** 0.0650* 0.0768** 
 (0.0320) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0380) (0.0425) (0.0332) P=0.05 
        
Observations 12,650 12,517 12,650 12,650 9,959 1,592 648 
R-squared 0.685 0.688 0.687 0.689 0.706 - - 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (SE) clustered at the household level in parentheses for columns (1) – (6); SE adjusted to account for 
uncertainty from propensity score estimation as in Abadie (2005) for column (7); p-values from a permutation test in 
parentheses in column (8). ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
2 The dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very dissatisfied”) and 5 the best (“very 
satisfied”). 
3 Columns (1) – (7) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead 
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time fixed 
effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare 
Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller because this data is not collected every wave and not 
everyone responds every wave; (6) reweighting each observation by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); 
(7) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match. Eq(1) describes the baseline model used in these checks. The sample is 
restricted to those age-eligible for the Silver Support Scheme (i.e. aged 65 and above) as of end-Sep 2016 (the month of the 
most recent Silver Support payout in our data), and with a propensity score of 0.2 – 0.8 for checks in columns (1) – (5). The 
full/untrimmed sample is used in column (6). The number of observations in columns (1) – (5) refer to the number of 
individual-month observations; those in columns (6) and (7) refer to number of respondents. 
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Table A7: Overall impact of the Silver Support Scheme on subjective well-being for full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Life satisfn 
Social 
satisfn 
Daily 
activities 
satisfn 
HH 
income 
satisfn 
Economic 
satisfn 
Health 
satisfn 
Self-rated 
health 
cond 
        
Received SS  Jan  0.0470 0.00342 0.0390 0.0457 0.0288 0.0120 -0.00775 
 (0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0356) 
Received SS  Feb 0.0149 -0.0181 -0.00302 0.0682* 0.0645* 0.0430 0.00273 
 (0.0348) (0.0333) (0.0366) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0372) (0.0362) 
Received SS  Mar  0.0582* 0.00581 0.0821** 0.0886** 0.105*** 0.0347 0.0401 
 (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0363) (0.0389) (0.0407) (0.0364) 
        
Received SS   
announce-to-disb 0.0875*** 0.0462* 0.0247 0.0957*** 0.0712** 0.0185 0.0252 
 (0.0291) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0289) (0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0283) 
Received SS   
post-disb 0.102*** 0.0662** 0.0559* 0.133*** 0.113*** 0.0288 0.0456 
 (0.0332) (0.0300) (0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0313) 
        
Mean 3.51 3.65 3.52 3.18 3.19 3.26 2.52 
S.D.  0.80 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 
Observations 23,665 23,663 21,983 23,655 23,657 23,662 23,658 
R-squared 0.684 0.658 0.693 0.707 0.698 0.720 0.724 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
2 Dependent variables shown at the top of each column are measured on a scale of 1 – 5. 1 represents the worst (“very 
dissatisfied” or “poor”) and 5 the best (“very satisfied” or “excellent”). 
3 Results are estimates of coefficients in eq(1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. 
aged 65 and above in 2016), live in public housing flats. This sample is not trimmed based on propensity score. 
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for respondents 
who received SSS payouts.  
 
 
 
